



DEBATE

EXPERTISE, WISDOM AND MORAL PHILOSOPHERS: A RESPONSE TO GESANG

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moral expertise, justification, wisdom, civic duty

**ABSTRACT**

*In a recent issue of Bioethics, Bernard Gesang asks whether a moral philosopher possesses greater moral expertise than a non-philosopher, and his answer is a qualified yes, based not so much on his infallible access to the truth, but on the quality of his theoretically-informed moral justifications. I reject Gesang's claim that there is such a thing as moral expertise, although the moral philosopher may well make a valid contribution to the ethics committee as a concerned and educated citizen. I suggest that wisdom is a lot more interesting to examine than moral expertise. Again, however, moral philosophers have no monopoly on wisdom, and the study of philosophy may even impede its cultivation.*

**I INTRODUCTION**

In a recent issue of *Bioethics*, Bernward Gesang asks what role moral philosophers (henceforward also called ethicists) can and should play in committees. Are their judgements, as expert judgements, superior to the moral judgements of other people? His answer is a qualified yes. Gesang puts forward the following scenario.

Suppose the Ethics Council of the German Minister of Public Health needs to advise on whether active euthanasia should be legalized. Ethicists in the council think 'yes', other participants think 'no'. Should the doctors and the lawyers of the council dispense with their moral judgements because the experts see it differently and thus reveal them to be mistaken?<sup>1</sup>

This is an excellent way to focus the debate about moral expertise, so let us examine the scenario in greater detail. Gesang considers two kinds of expertise: 'full' and 'semi'. The full expert is one with a command of technical information and skills not available to the layperson: the doctors and the lawyers on the committee are full experts in their respective disciplines, and the ethicist is an expert in moral philosophy (as opposed to morality). In the

event of disagreement, the full expert can legitimately *silence* the layperson, since the layperson has only minimal grounds for legitimate doubt. So if the layperson complains of a pain in his ear, the doctor can examine the layperson, diagnose the defect, and prescribe a solution: 'you have an ear infection, take these antibiotics for a week'. The layperson then only has flimsy grounds to ignore her advice: perhaps the layperson thinks that he is tough enough to weather the infection without 'molly-coddling' treatment, perhaps the layperson has an alternative folk-medical belief that the pain has been caused by physical trauma rather than infection. In either case, he can refuse the doctor's advice – for the layperson can do what he likes with his body – but he cannot *argue* with the doctor, cannot show her that she is mistaken. Perhaps the layperson is being foolish and irrational, but he has a right to be. (The layperson might be able to argue with the doctor's judgement in the event that he can show that non-medical circumstances, such as inebriation, are interfering with the doctor's judgement, or that the doctor is neglecting basic rules of hygiene.)

The important point about full expertise is one of privileged access to knowledge and skills: the doctor can partly explain and justify her decision in folk-medical terms, invoking metaphors of plumbing, car mechanics, and warfare (fighting the invading germs), but beyond that she can only say 'if you studied medicine at school

<sup>1</sup> B. Gesang. Are Moral Philosophers Moral Experts? *Bioethics* 2010; 24(4): 153.

and practised the relevant diagnostic skills, you would come to the same conclusion, and for the same reasons, that I did. Since you did not study medicine, you have to trust me.' Now Gesang concedes that 'moral philosophers cannot say to their students: "your opinion is just false" as physicists can' (p. 158). But on the Ethics Council they nevertheless have the status of 'semi-experts', where semi-expertise comprises a knowledge of *moral theory* and the skill of deploying it appropriately in the justification of moral arguments. So while he cannot silence the layperson (or the doctor or the lawyer on the Council), the ethicist's moral judgements are still worth according greater weight to than those of the doctor or the lawyer.

For Gesang, there are four sources of justification, which support and correct each other under the aegis of a coherentist 'reflective equilibrium' (John Rawls's term), such that 'a justified moral judgement occurs when all four sources favour the same solution'. These sources are: (i) moral theories; (ii) one kind of moral intuitions, which are moral feelings 'which arise spontaneously and uncontrolled with the perception of single cases'; (iii) another kind of moral intuitions, which are common-sense theories containing 'generalizations of moral experience and simple principles such as "if everyone were to do this . . ."' ; (iv) non-moral knowledge of facts and theories (p. 156). Conclusion: because 'only ethicists know moral theories,' then 'only ethicists can reach correct moral judgements with high probability and for the right reasons;' whereas 'the decisions of ordinary people can only be *dominated by intuitions*' (p. 158, italics in original.).

My first response is: the lady doth protest too much, methinks. If moral philosophers genuinely had even the semi-expertise he speaks of, then why would there be any need to write this article? Experts in medicine or law do not write articles to explain the grounds of their expertise! Gesang correctly perceives a widespread scepticism about the role of moral philosophers on committees, and has offered up an elaborate legitimization package. The worry is that the package comes wrapped in the philosopher's own idiom, and so Gesang is likely to be preaching only to the converted. The remaining members of the Council will be inclined to see it merely as further evidence of the philosopher's hubris and preciousness, and . . . who invited him anyway?

## II PHILOSOPHERS AND NON-PHILOSOPHERS

But there is a real question behind Gesang's article, and that is: what exactly do moral philosophers achieve through their long lonely studies of arcane tomes? Clearly they achieve expertise in the academic discipline of moral philosophy, an expertise which is recognized by students

and peers alike. And for many moral philosophers that's enough. But there is also an uneasiness among other moral philosophers about being holed up in the ivory tower: these philosophers feel they have something to offer the community, not just as concerned citizens, not just as members of the intelligentsia, but as moral philosophers. So a more charitable reading of Gesang's thesis might be as an attempt to ground the moral philosopher's civic duty. But what exactly does the moral philosopher offer that no one else does? Certainly they acquire some knowledge of relevant non-moral facts, as Gesang says: the moral philosopher arguing in favour of legalising stem cell research, for example, will come to know something about the science of stem cell research and about the current legislative prohibitions. However, there are plenty of other people who know a lot more about the relevant non-moral facts: stem cell scientists and medical lawyers, for example, and their claim to moral expertise is surely much more robust insofar as it is based on their greater non-moral expertise.

One answer that Gesang considers (p. 154) and eventually rejects is that of Peter Singer:<sup>2</sup> the ethicist possesses a deeper knowledge of the relevant *arguments* that can be deployed for and against a particular motion, together with their weaknesses, assumptions and implications. After all, surely studying and assessing arguments is precisely what philosophers spend most of their time doing. When sitting on the Ethics Council, the philosopher can therefore offer a clear and precise summary of what one member is arguing, and can help another member to articulate his hitherto vague doubts upon hearing the first member's arguments. This approach goes back to Socrates, who saw himself as a midwife assisting others to give birth to their ideas and opinions. However, there are limits to the philosopher's midwifery, as Gesang recognizes: merely knowing what the arguments are does not allow one to take and defend a position when acting as an expert on a committee. Since all the interesting questions of applied ethics have strong arguments on both sides, a merely knowledgeable philosopher is just as likely to suffer the fate of Buridan's ass, who could not decide which of two identical bundles of hay to eat first, and therefore starved to death.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Singer P. Moral Experts. *Analysis* 1972; 32: 115–117.

<sup>3</sup> However, is this even-handedness such a bad thing? True, the committee still needs to make a decision. But outside the committee, there is something to be said for the philosopher who understands either how balanced the arguments are, or how complicated the arguments are by non-moral facts, and therefore withholds commitment to either side. Robert Nozick, in his autobiographical work *The Examined Life* (Simon & Schuster, 1990), confesses that as a youth he had opinions about everything, and felt he *ought* to have opinions, especially as a political philosopher and champion of libertarianism. Now that he was older, there were plenty of things that he did not have an opinion on, and not because he was indifferent. This, he suggests, might be a sign of wisdom.

So Gesang sees the philosopher not only as having a knowledge of the arguments etc., but also as using that knowledge to examine his own moral intuitions, within the constraints of the relevant non-moral facts also known to him, and arriving by reflective equilibrium at a high probability of correct judgement.

There is a problem here with the word ‘philosopher’. Gesang presumably has in mind someone with a doctorate in philosophy, and someone who has spent time working as a philosophy academic: teaching philosophy, reading philosophy and writing philosophy. But there are others who can ‘do’ philosophy, outside the philosophy seminar room. If philosophy comprises the analysis and criticism of arguments, a certain abstractness of ideas, or an attempt to develop conflicting intuitions into systemic theory, then *all* the humanities and the social sciences are engaged, to some degree, in philosophy. This means that the other members of the Council might have the same if not better expertise as the card-carrying philosopher. But Gesang is specifically interested in moral theory, the sort of thing that only philosophers study.

There are two classes of moral theory standardly on offer: meta-ethical theories (such as realism or subjectivism) about the metaphysical status of the objects referred to by moral concepts, and normative theories (such as utilitarianism or Kantianism), which offer guidance for actions and grounds of judgement. Although Gesang does not spell this out, presumably he takes a realist stance with regard to the first class of theories, but is more interested in the second class. But what does it mean to say that a philosopher has a better knowledge of a normative ethical theory such as utilitarianism? This question has a clear enough answer inside the philosophy seminar, but what about in our opening scenario? The ethicist sitting on the Ethics Council says yes to the legalization of active euthanasia, while the doctors and the lawyers say no. What might the ethicist say to justify his position?

The problem with taking euthanasia as an example – as opposed to something relatively abstract like stem cell research – is that *every* educated person already knows the main arguments about euthanasia, more or less; every half-imaginative person has reflected on their own death and the possibility of great suffering; every person over 25 has met or heard of someone who died either in great suffering or in a coma, and many have said to themselves ‘better to be killed than go through that’. In this way, the euthanasia debate is much more *personal* than the stem cell research debate, and not at all the ‘property’ of the philosopher. The layperson with the slightest curiosity can read a great deal from newspapers, and without ever consulting a philosopher. There are no radically new arguments waiting to be discovered and advanced by philosophers as part of their putative job to educate and advise the public. Even if a layperson attending a popular

philosophy evening lecture has not heard the arguments for a while, she would make sense of them pretty quickly, and she would probably know where she stood. On the Ethics Council, the doctors and the lawyers would certainly have a deeply informed opinion on the matter, and a deep knowledge of the arguments for and against, so it’s not clear what the ethicist can contribute by way of an original justification. Indeed, the ethicist is stuck between the rock of redundancy and the hard place of unintelligibility. If he is not theoretical enough, he will not be telling the other committee members anything new, and can certainly not claim expertise. If he is too theoretical, the rest of the committee will not understand him, and will not even be persuaded of the *need* for a theory to resolve the disagreement. And as Gesang stresses: the ethicist cannot say ‘trust me, I’m an ethicist, I’ve studied this problem longer than you have, but you lack the necessary training to understand my justification and so will have to trust me.’

Perhaps the ethicist might deploy a utilitarian justification for legalizing euthanasia. The problem here is that there are familiar utilitarian reasons on *both* sides of the euthanasia debate: on the one hand legalized euthanasia cuts short the suffering of the terminally ill; on the other it generates anxiety about mistakes and slippery slopes. And nobody seriously believes that the suffering and the anxiety can be measured and compared in order to generate a ‘correct’ trade-off. At the same time there are good deontological reasons on both sides of the euthanasia debate: on the one hand legalized euthanasia would amount to deliberate killing; on the other it would promote autonomy. And of course individual deontological arguments can be deployed against utilitarian intuitions and vice versa. All of these theoretical considerations draw their support from widespread intuitions. But the ethicist – like everyone else – then invokes *second-order* intuitions to stipulate that one consideration outweighs the other. It might seem more theoretical, but it is still an intuition. What further theoretical arguments could be adduced without intuition and stipulation here? Certainly there are familiar ways to ‘save’ utilitarianism as a pet theory from deontological criticisms, for example by invoking the long-term utility of having deontological rules. But what can this saving manoeuvre be other than a contrivance to provide intellectual gravitas to what remains an intuition?

Let me qualify my use of the word ‘contrivance’. I am saying that the ethicist’s justifications for legalizing euthanasia are a contrivance because everyone on the Council is already more than familiar with the possible justifications for positions on either side of the issue. The justification that *this* ethicist offers on *this* occasion is merely an expanded description of his moral judgement on the matter: he is telling the committee which considerations have turned out to be decisive for him. These

considerations then become contrived if they are dressed up in the language of privileged access to the truth.

Some people hold a position on the euthanasia debate that they *refuse* to justify, and this can nevertheless be philosophically legitimate. Imagine a doctor on the Ethics Council responding to the ethicist's judgement by saying 'I'm sorry, I have thought about this deeply and I believe euthanasia is murder.' What *more* can he say than that? He has made himself perfectly plain, without necessarily revealing that he is close-minded in a bad way. In this respect I would have to disagree strongly with Gesang's claim that 'moral experience is never unproblematic. Even standard cases like "Torture is an evil" can be discussed critically, as the recent debates about "ticking bomb scenarios" show' (p. 157). I would claim that much, if not most, moral experience is unproblematic, precisely in that it never occurs to the experiencer to question it. Gesang complained that non-ethicists would be 'dominated by their intuitions' as if they were some wild beasts, but insofar as 'domination' is the appropriate word here at all, then the doctor who declares that euthanasia is murder is hardly a wild beast. Our social life as we know it would be unliveable if we questioned our shared moral intuitions at every juncture: think about how long it takes children to learn the rules of good behaviour, and we don't encourage them to discuss them. Indeed, it is only against the background of widely and successfully inculcated moral intuitions that we can even make sense of, and deal with, a moral disagreement *as a disagreement*, rather than as two people talking in different languages past each other. And even if many people are unsure about their position on euthanasia, even if they find themselves persuaded by a particular person deploying a particular theoretical justification, there are some for whom the topic of euthanasia is not *ethically* problematic at all (although it may well be complicated in other ways, logistically, or emotionally). And surely the vast majority of people would agree, unproblematically, with a statement such as 'torture is evil'. A very small group of sadists would not undermine this statement's status, nor would the incredibly small number of ticking bomb scenarios. And even if – and this is an awfully big 'if' – it could be justifiable to use torture to find out where the ticking bomb is, that does not in the slightest reduce the gravity of torture as one of the worst moral crimes.

### III GETTING IT RIGHT

Ultimately, Gesang says, 'only ethicists can reach a complete reflective equilibrium and only ethicists reach correct moral judgements with high probability and for the right reasons' (p. 158). The 'right reasons' part refers to the justification, which we have discussed. What does 'correct' mean in this context, however? And how does

probability enter into it? Gesang seems to have in mind something like scientific predictions (hypotheses) being subsequently corroborated or falsified, and the scientist thereby developing a track record expressed as a percentage of correct predictions. The doctors sitting on the Ethics Council would be very familiar with this approach to knowledge. In addition, the doctors also possess something called clinical judgement, which is defined precisely by the lack of theoretical justification for a given intervention, but which also presupposes that the intervention can subsequently be assessed as successful or not.

Can ethics be modelled on scientific procedure or clinical judgement in this way? Surely not. Gesang himself accepts that 'moral experience is different in character from non-moral experience' (p. 156), but does not realize the full implications of this. The ethicist comes to the committee and makes his moral judgement 'euthanasia should be legalized' and offers his reasons (utilitarian, deontological) etc.. What would it mean for this to be *proved correct*, or even corroborated? For that matter, what does it mean for the judgement to be proved false? Imagine that the ethicist wins the argument, the Council recommend legalization, and a new Dutch-like system is introduced to Germany. What exactly are the success criteria of the ethicist's and the Council's judgement? A number of cases of euthanasia that might have been covert will now take place overtly – is this an improvement or a deterioration from the previous legislative framework? All we can say is: *some* people will see it as an improvement, some will not. There is no proof here, to which all reasonable are answerable; instead there will be a new moral debate about whether the legislation has gone too far.

In science there are unknown facts of the matter, and the scientist is answerable to these facts. It is very clear what sort of facts, once discovered, will corroborate or falsify her hypothesis, and then she has to retract her hypothesis and start again. It's true, of course, that some scientific results can be ambiguous or inconclusive, but the possibility of ambiguity or inconclusiveness only makes sense *as* ambiguity or inconclusiveness in contrast with and against a background of clear examples of successful corroboration and falsification. And even when results are inconclusive and scientists continue to disagree about, say, the main cause of a particular event, they usually agree about the type of experiment that could in principle be constructed to test the hypothesis.

If the ethicist invokes non-moral facts as part of his judgement and justification, *these* can be corrected, that's true. If the ethicist suggests that 'Euthanasia should be legalized just like it is in Britain', then a relevant response would be to say that euthanasia is not legal in Britain. But once the ethicist and the rest of the Council agree on the relevant facts, but disagree on the moral judgement, then there is no *scientific* way of testing both the judgement

and the counter-judgement to see which one must be 'right'. There is room for further argument and counter-argument, of course; and some optimistic moral philosophers would claim that further argument will eventually converge on the moral truth, but surely the euthanasia debate is at least one area of ethics where disagreement has proven recalcitrant for so long, *even when* both sides are sufficiently knowledgeable about moral theory, sufficiently well-informed of the non-moral facts, and sufficiently open-minded and unprejudiced.

At that point the resolution of the disagreement between the ethicist and the rest of the committee is a *political* matter. I am using the word 'political' here in a special sense, to indicate a decision that is reached according to a particular procedure (e.g. a democratic procedure, but it doesn't have to be), and that is made by some person or body with legitimate authority. A political decision has to be made at the moment when ethical discussion has failed to converge; as such there will always be people who do not agree with the political decision, and they will have a further dilemma of whether to co-operate with what they consider to be morally wrong, or whether they will take their persuasion efforts to another forum. So in the case of the Ethics Council, at some point it will become clear, if not to all participants then at least to the Council chair, that the moral debate is not converging on consensus (let alone truth), and the chair will have to rule on the matter, perhaps by taking a vote. If the ethicist has been overruled, perhaps there will be space in the final wording of the Council's judgement to include the details of the dissenting opinion, but otherwise the ethicist has no grounds to complain about being unfairly ignored.

The ethicist, once overruled, may well continue to believe that the Council made the *incorrect* decision, but the words 'incorrect' and 'correct' mean very different things here than in the case of the scientist whose hypothesis has been falsified. Such a scientist has no grounds for believing that his hypothesis remains correct, despite the successful falsification – and he would not be taken seriously at all by the rest of the scientific establishment if he tried to assert it. Whereas it is in the nature of ethics for disagreements to linger beyond political resolution, even after all factual disagreements have been resolved, and even when no plausible account of prejudice, ignorance or intellectual laziness can be mounted by one side against the other. And of course it would be naïve to suggest that political resolutions are correct by definition, or that the will of the democratic majority is always right. It's true that in Holland a majority of the member of Parliament are sufficiently satisfied with the legislation as it stands that they have not challenged it: but this does not mean that Parliament has made a correct moral judgement, or even that the Dutch Parliament has made a correct judgement for the Dutch people.

The thing about a moral judgement is that it is closely connected with one's moral perspective on the world. A moral perspective is to be distinguished from an empirical perspective precisely in the status of the objects on which one has the perspective. All scientists are answerable to a *singular* realm of discoverable facts. But the same facts may well have different moral significance for different individuals. It is important to emphasize that I am not advocating moral subjectivism or relativism here, or at least not a subjectivism of the pernicious kind which both Gesang and I are keen to avoid. Pernicious subjectivism involves the idea that I can 'make' something morally permissible simply by declaring it so; or that my judgement that X is morally permissible can be reduced to an expression of my merely liking X. Nothing could be further from our familiar moral experiences: we *care* about doing things that we consider morally permissible or impermissible, in a way that we do not care about genuinely subjective things such as musical or gastronomic taste. We care about trying to persuade other people to see a moral issue in our way. Some people care about certain things so much that they are willing to go sharply against their self-interest, perhaps to the point of sacrificing their lives. And again, for any society to work, most of us have to care about the same things. In other words, moral experience is oriented around a world full of a significance that is just as objective as that of scientific facts.

So Gesang's thesis about the ethicist's expertise is wrong: in the example in question, the ethicist is just one person on the Ethics Council, with no claim to superior (or inferior) moral weight. He is welcome to engage in the discussion about the legalization of euthanasia alongside the other members. In this I concur with C.D. Broad, whom Gesang cites: 'Moral philosophers, as such, have no special information, not available to the general public, about what is right and what is wrong.'<sup>4</sup> But more than this, I claim that there is no such thing as moral expertise at all.

#### IV WISDOM

Now, if there is no such thing as moral expertise, what is there to be said for moral judgement and wisdom? I want to spend this final section gesturing in a different direction. Gesang explicitly distinguishes his account from an Aristotelian account of *phronesis* (p. 158). Many moral philosophers are suspicious of the notion, not because they doubt its existence, but because they see it as no more than a reliable disposition to discover the correct action in a particular situation: and if that is the case,

<sup>4</sup> Broad C. D. 1952. *Ethics and the History of Philosophy*. London: Routledge, cited by Gesang, *op. cit.* note 1, p. 154.

these philosophers continue, then we might as well go straight to the heart of the matter, that is, to the question of what is the correct action. But phronesis has its modern supporters, sometimes called virtue theorists, who claim that all too often the morally correct thing to do in a particular situation cannot be observed unambiguously, cannot be derived from general principles, and that it is only the phronimos (the person with phronesis) who can observe it and then carry it out. The chosen action will be revealed by the phronimos as the one that was 'there' already, and should have been taken all along, and the rest of us should watch the phronimos, and then go and do likewise (i.e. this should not be interpreted as the Phronimos making the action right in virtue of his choosing it arbitrarily). The assumption here is that the correctness of the action will be successfully revealed after its choice by the Phronimos, and that in this way the Phronimos will develop a track record of success.

This seems to have a lot in common with Gesang's conception, and so it is surprising that he did not make more use of it. But the question for this final section is whether my rejection of moral expertise entails a rejection of phronesis. My answer is no, I do acknowledge room for an irreducible notion of phronesis, but that once again, this is accessible to everyone in principle, not just to moral philosophers. Indeed, because of the pervasive sceptical attitude encouraged in philosophy, it could be said that philosophy undermines a healthy development of phronesis, and erodes the trust in one's maturing instincts.

However, the phronesis I accept is importantly different from the original Greek version described above, and so I'm going to use the more familiar and non-technical term 'wisdom'. Given the etymology of the name of their discipline, the paucity of philosophical interest in wisdom is surprising. I want to distinguish four kinds of wisdom here. The first has to do with ordinary moral maturation, with becoming a responsible adult, with living a life of reasonable complexity in professional and personal relationships, during which one has encountered enough adversity and disagreement to reflect on and discover what is most important to one. This is what separates most adults from most teenagers, and why it is safe to say that there have never been any child geniuses in morality. Moral maturity has to do with the time-consuming business of living a life, and no amount of rote learning or high-powered brainwork is going to accelerate that. Here it makes sense to say to a child that he should trust me simply because I am an adult and I am wiser.

That meaning of wisdom is fairly straightforward. The other three meanings are more tricky. The first might be characterized by the public figure with great moral authority partly in virtue of his accomplishments, someone like Mandela or Luther King. The second might

be characterized by a personal acquaintance (my great-aunt, say) whom I consider to have great moral authority, but who is unknown to the wider world. The difference between King and my great-aunt is not merely one of impact; it also says something about who I am and about our relationship that I admire my great-aunt and seek her advice; plenty of other people might not consider her wise at all. But there are two important things about the wise. First, King's wisdom consists not in propositional knowledge, nor in the skilful deployment of theoretical justifications, but rather, in the words of Raimond Gaita, in the fact that he has lived his life and nobody else's, that he has something to say, and the courage to say it, and that he stands fully behind what he has to say. Indeed, the words that he utters on a given occasion might not be that original or deep, but the fact that he said them, from the depths of his life, made the listener understand for the first time what they meant.<sup>5</sup> The second important thing is that neither King nor my great-aunt are immune to moral criticism in the same way that an eminent scientist is immune to scientific criticism by a lay person. If King had been publicly exposed during his life as the notorious philanderer that he was, he would not be able to tell the masses 'trust me, I'm an expert, I know what I'm doing', nor would he even be able to come up with a moral justification that was anything but contrived.

The fourth category of wisdom is that associated with long years of interaction with people, especially people in crisis, and here I have in mind the wisdom of teachers, social workers, psychotherapists, priests, nurses, and doctors (perhaps novelists as well). There is no guarantee that long years will be sufficient for wisdom, of course, they may also engender bitterness and cynicism. And there need be no correlation between a person's human wisdom and their professional competence. But here wisdom will have something to do with a capacity to listen, to understand, to empathize – again, things that require no propositional or theoretical content at all.

There is plenty more to say about wisdom, but it would exceed the scope of this paper and this journal. Suffice to say that it is a lot more interesting as a concept than mere expertise.

A moral philosopher might well acquire one of these types of wisdom, and this might make him an appropriate member of the Ethics Council. But there is no guarantee that his philosophical training will help him toward this goal, and it might well impede it.

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<sup>5</sup> R. Gaita. Narrative, Identity and Moral Philosophy. *Philosophical Papers* 2003; 32(3).